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4I. Introduction
Judgement is an intrinsically complex matter. This is an ontological truth, if we follow 
Hölderlin’s thesis. Judgement, he claims, is “in the highest and strictest sense the 
original sundering of Subject and Object most intimately united in intellectual intuition 
[…]” (Hölderlin, 1972, p. 516).1 As such, judgement would be opposed to being, which 
“expresses the joining of Subject and Object” (Hölderlin, 1972, p. 515). Hence, there is 
an implicit predicament in making judgement, for it requires sundering that which our 
very being attempts to join, namely object and subject. We can support this view if we 
consider Aristotle’s distinction between decision and judgement. By contrast to 
decision, as Aristotle puts it, judgement is “about what we do not know at all to be 
good” and praised with regard to its truth (NE III. 2; 1112a8-9)2. And it is complex to 
make a judgement, to choose the right course of action about matters one does “not 
know at all to be good”.3 It appears that judgement is a phenomenon at odds with the 
human condition.
Having approved its intrinsic complexity, there are two ways to deal with 
judgement as a subject matter. One might completely refrain from further inquiries into 
the subject because it seems too daunting; let us call this the path of fear. Or, the 
complexity of judgement works as a captivation and encourages one to author the
comprehensive solution to the problem; the latter I consider the path of boldness. But 
fear and boldness are vices that should be avoided. Let us then aim at the third way and 
try to hit the mean between both vices. To avoid the path of excessive fear, we should 
not capitulate with regards to the complex nature of judgement but dare an approach. 
Yet, to bypass the path of boldness, we should not pretend to develop an all-embracing 
scheme that unravels the mysteries of judgement. Instead, in terms of the objective of 
this study’s approach, we should be fully conscious of its boundaries and limitations.
                                               
1 Hölderlin’s substantiates this claim, showing that the original sundering of subject and object is the Ur-
Teilung and therefore related to the German word for judgement, namely Urteil (Hölderlin, 1972). 
2 2 Hereafter, by NE, I shall refer to the Nicomachean Ethics in Rowe’s version (see reference list: 
Aristotle, 2002); similarly, by Pol., I refer to Lord’s version of The Politics (see reference list: Aristotle, 
1984).
3 Maybe this epistemological void explains why judgement is “virtually always potentially vulnerable” 
(Dunn, 2000, p. 183).
5Therefore, this investigation is limited to a specific sort of judgement, namely 
political judgement. Moreover, this inquiry is limited as I will look at political 
judgement mainly from one specific viewpoint, the viewpoint of Aristotelian theory. 
Also, we will limit ourselves to one specific interest about political judgement. This 
interest refers to how political judgment can be made and originates in the idea to 
propose a mode of deliberation that implies the exercise of phronēsis in such 
judgements. This mode of deliberation shall be named phronetic political judgement.4
The subsequent chapter will serve to introduce what we mean when we talk of political 
judgement. Further, I will begin to develop the proposal for phronetic judgement, 
arguing that two conditions for the plausibility of such a proposal are fulfilled: the 
virtue phronēsis embodies characteristics that make it (1) applicable to political 
judgement and (2) a promising candidate in terms of contributing to such judgement’s 
validity.
Based on the encouraging insights from Chapter II, the proposal for phronetic 
judgement will be completed in Chapter III. How phronetic judgement as a mode of 
deliberation can function as well as some important qualifications will be examined. An 
interpretation of the classical readings of the Aristotelian action-syllogism will be the 
key to find a reasonable solution to the complications that originate in the view that 
phronēsis enables us to deliberate about – and only about – means to ends. With regard 
to the supposed appeal of our deliberative mode, it must be outlined what it takes to 
become a phronimos. Experience and excellence of character are equally important, as I 
will show.
Promoting phronetic judgement inevitably affiliates one to some extent to the 
broader theory of virtue ethics. How exactly the proposal at the core of this paper is 
embedded within the field of ethical theories will be clarified in Chapter IV. I will argue 
that phronetic judgement is a remarkably distinct approach to moral judgement in 
comparison to the accounts that derive from the enlightenment ethics. In particular with 
regard to the situational character of political judgement, it seems that our proposal 
displays a promising alternative. Phronetic judgement is less rule-bound, more agent-
                                               
4 In the following, I will abbreviate the term and mostly use phronetic judgement, implying that we talk of 
the political sort of judgement.
6centred and balanced in terms of the duality of intuition and reason than rival ethical 
accounts, but nonetheless a sort of principled ethical framework.
In the last chapter, we will focus on the political ramifications of the proposal 
for phronetic judgement. In particular two serious concerns must be considered, namely 
to what extent phronetic judgement is contradictory to the truth of pluralism and to the 
rule of law. I will uphold the claim on the value of phonetic judgement. Regarding both 
concerns, arguments will be provided that can mitigate the alleged contradictions. The 
phronimos is not only wise but also a just and reasonable person that has an eye for the 
plural conceptions of the good as well as for the importance of the law.
7II. The Possibility of Phronetic Judgement
It is the aim of this chapter to demonstrate that exercising phronēsis in political 
judgement is possible. By possible, I mean that we will not yet be able to formulate the 
claim for phronetic judgement by the end of this chapter. Rather, we will prepare the 
grounds for this claim discussing two of its necessary conditions. These two conditions 
derive from the fact that – in terms of political judgement – we must distinguish 
between two levels of inquiry (cf. Blaug, 2000, p. 181). First, the phenomenological 
inquiry that deals with the question on how the judgement is made and in what kind of 
setting or circumstances it takes place. Second, the crucial normative level that explores 
the validity of a judgement, more precisely whether a judgement is true or false. For the 
purpose of our study, this translates into the following: apparently, the plausibility of 
our proposal on exercising phronēsis in political judgement depends on the necessary 
conditions that (1) phronēsis and political judgement correspond in terms of their 
phenomenological characteristics, and further that (2) phronēsis enables us to make true 
political judgement.
First, I will need to introduce what precisely is meant by political judgement. 
Because the concept is prominent in academic discussion and used in diverse contexts it 
will be crucial to carefully define its boundaries for the purpose of this study. To 
exemplify matters here and throughout the rest of the paper, we also present a real-life 
case of the sort of political judgement we want to investigate. Then I wish to elaborate 
on the above noted two necessary conditions at the core of our proposal, starting with 
the phenomenological part to show that with regard to the process and setting, phronēsis
is applicable to political judgement. After that, we will scrutinize the normative aspect 
learning that in fact the exercise of phronēsis can enable us to make valid political 
judgements. Based on these findings, we will be able to argue for the possibility of 
phronetic judgement.
On Political Judgement
To exemplify what political judgement is, and also to render palpable its peculiar 
characteristics, consider the case of Stanislav Petrov. Stanislav Petrov was lieutenant 
colonel on duty in a bunker somewhere in the Soviet Union, when in 1983 – more 
8precisely on September 26 – the Russian anti-missile system reported that several U.S. 
intercontinental missiles had been launched (Granoff, 2009, p. 87). The blips indicating 
the supposed U.S. missiles appeared on the screen of Stanislav Petrov, but the lieutenant 
colonel had doubts about the reliability of the alarm. Being aware that both, the 
antimissile defence system as well as the possible strike-back, would have to be 
launched within several minutes, Petrov was put in the complex situation to judge on 
the right course of action. On the one hand, Petrov could follow the internal convention 
that stipulates to delegate the responsibility in simply reporting the alarm to the political 
and military authorities, knowing that this might cause an attack of immediate nuclear 
retaliation. Or, on the other hand, the lieutenant colonel may first use his very capacity 
to reason whether the alarm were correct or false, thereby taking the responsibility and 
recognizing possible consequences of true or false judgement.  
As I believe, the case of Stanislav Petrov illustrates well the sort of judgement 
that will be subject to this inquiry as well as the inherent set of problems. What do I 
mean by that? There are judgements that only affect the agent himself. For instance, we 
may think of situations in which we have to judge whether an investment is right or 
wrong, a job offer is suitable or not, and alike. From the subjective viewpoint of the 
respective agent, such judgements might be as complex as Petrov’s, but what is distinct 
is that they are in their scope strictly private. By contrast, Petrov’s judgement exceeds in 
its meaning and impact the private sphere of the agent. Whether Stanislav Petrov would 
confirm and report the alarm or not might have had profound consequences for the well-
being of many people. In fact, the truth of the Russian soldier’s judgement affected the 
security of the inhabitants of the Soviet Union; that is why it has been solemnly 
declared that at this particular moment “the future of the world rested in his hands” (The 
Guardian, 2008).
This case, therefore, is typical for the sort of judgement we shall call political
judgement, defined as “judgements made not only about politics, but in a political spirit, 
prudently pursuing security and justice in a real community […]” (Ruderman, 1997, p. 
410).5 As an exercise in political philosophy, this investigation looks at such political
                                               
5 Geuss (in Bourke and Geuss, 2009) provides a similar definition of political judgement as “a judgement 
not about a certain domain, but rather as a judgement about almost any domain whatever which as a 
judgement had a certain character. To say that a judgement ‘has a political character’ however, means that 
someone can look at it in a certain way, namely as an action with implications for further instances or 
9sort of judgement, and for the largest part disregards judgement that touches the private 
sphere of the respective agent. Further - as the definition above indicates – we employ a 
relatively narrow notion within the literature on political judgement. Take for example 
voting, which as an act could be reasonably considered a political judgement.6 Indeed, 
the voter’s choice is certainly one made “in a political spirit”. Our definition, however, 
limits the focus to judgement that is about the “security and justice in a real 
community”, and voting generally speaking is not of this sort. Let us then further 
specify what the definition of political judgement we employ really means. Voting –
and in fact most judgement – is conventional and thus often habitual (Dunn, 2000, p. 
183). By contrast, political judgement as we mean to discuss it targets non-conventional 
circumstances such as crisis and exceptional settings. The latter is also exemplified by 
the case of Stanislav Petrov and manifest in our definition as we speak of judgements 
that address “the security and justice” of a community. And judgements that are about 
such important goods must not be considered conventional or habitual, but exceptional 
and situational. What then are further characteristics of political judgement?
Of course, political judgement implies that there is some discretionary power7 on 
the side of the agent. For if there is no discretion, there is also no choice. And if there is 
no choice, there is evidently no judgement. Practically, the discretionary power in the 
case of Stanislav Petrov consists of his capability to judge whether the supposed alarm 
is true or not. What the case of Petrov additionally uncovers is that this discretionary 
power may or may not be assigned to the agent.8 Clearly, Petrov’s duty would have 
been to report the alarm to his authorities; an alternative course of action for the 
lieutenant colonel would have been to take the discretionary power to resist the 
convention with regard to the immediacy of the judgement.9
                                                                                                                                         
forms of collective human action” (p. 40). Note that both, the definition as well as the presented example
do not necessarily imply that a political judgement has to be about politics; neither has it to be made by a 
politician. Also public officials and even citizens may find themselves in situations where they have to 
make a political judgement.
6 An example of such a broader view on political judgement can be found in John Dunn’s The Cunning of 
Unreason, see (Dunn, 2000, pp. 93).
7 I borrow the term from my reading of Richardson’s book (see: Richardson, 2002) and the essay 
collection on political judgement (see: Bourke and Geuss, 2009). I think the concept is self-explanatory; 
however, it might be worth a note that it seems to me Richardson uses it with a slightly negative tone 
whereas I do not.
8 Whether this discretionary power is given or taken shall not be relevant at this stage, but I will resume 
this discussion in Chapter V.
9 For Dunn (2000), all judgement is in epistemological terms immediate (p. 183).
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This immediacy is additionally relevant as it indicates a further feature of 
political judgement as we discuss it. Recall that there were only several minutes 
available for Petrov to choose the best course of action. His judgement, therefore, had to 
be made within a given time period – a rather short one to be precise – and in the given 
setting – namely in the bunker. Hence, we can strengthen the claim that this sort of 
political judgement is situational. To summarize the characteristics of political 
judgement: the issue we address focuses on an agent who has – or has taken – the
discretionary power to make a political judgement, whereas the latter is made in a 
political spirit, in some sort of non-conventional – or specific – setting and of immediate 
and situational character. This is precisely the case we wish to address with the proposal 
at the core of this study. But, why then approaching the issue through Aristotelian 
ethics?
Attempts to examine political judgement of this sort, as Bourke and Geuss 
(2009) correctly assert, always entail the struggle to deal with the complex relation 
between politics and morals. For that reason, it is not surprising that we seek for 
guidance in ethics, and more precisely in Aristotle’s treatises.10 For it is Aristotle who 
perceives ethics and politics as two elements constituting the discipline of practical 
sciences, whereas ethics provide the foundation for good political acts and in turn 
political acts should serve the practical purpose of ethics (Barnes, 1995, p.25; Kraut, 
2002, p. 17). So to illuminate the complex relation of politics and morals in political 
judgement, Aristotle’s account seems to be promising because ethics – as the study of 
the human good – is not theoretical but belongs to the science of politics (NE 1103b26-
29; Kraut, 2002, p.3). Two central treatises are the Nicomachean Ethics, focusing on the 
nature of the well-being, and The Politics, in which Aristotle examines first and 
foremost how cities can be organized. Following Kraut’s suggestion (2002), we will 
discuss both writings as two parts of one larger examination in order to gain insight into 
the ethical and political implications of judgement as discussed here (pp. 94-95). 
Having indicated the general applicability of Aristotle’s theory to matters of ethico-
political nature, we can begin our argument about the Aristotelian virtue phronēsis.
Based on the above noted characteristics of political judgement, it will be now the task 
                                               
10 Of course, Aristotle is by no means the only candidate for an investigation on political judgement. 
Additional accounts on ethical theory to examine judgement – or better moral judgement – will be 
discussed in Chapter IV.
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to show that the Aristotelian virtue phronēsis can be applied in such situations. Recall 
that we have indicated two necessary conditions for the plausibility of phronēsis as an 
appropriate candidate and let us begin with a closer examination of the first condition.
The Phenomenology of Phronetic Judgement
Necessary condition (1) for our proposal on phronetic judgement consists of the 
requirement that with regard to the process and setting, phronēsis must be applicable to 
political judgement. So, first we must learn what phronēsis – or practical wisdom11 –
actually is and then we will scrutinize whether it corresponds with what is required in 
situations of political judgement.
For Aristotle, just as the soul has two parts – one that possesses the capacity to 
reason and one that is non-rational but enables us to consider reason – so we can divide 
the human excellences into intellectual excellences and character-excellences (NE I. 13, 
1103a1-6). What precisely distinguishes both sorts of excellences will be relevant at a 
later stage of the discussion. For the present purpose, it suffices to establish that 
phronēsis is related to the rational part of the soul and thus belongs to the intellectual 
excellences. More concretely, practical wisdom is characterized as a “disposition 
accompanied by rational prescription, true, in the sphere of human goods, relating to 
action” (NE VI. 5, 1140b20-22). These characteristics of phronēsis will now be 
scrutinized separately in order to learn about the nature of practical wisdom. As 
Aristotle himself introduces phronēsis together with the other virtues in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, it might contribute to a better understanding to additionally 
demonstrate the scope of phronēsis in relation to the remaining intellectual virtues, 
                                               
11 Hereafter, I will use phronēsis and practical wisdom interchangeably. Several translations of phronēsis
are prevalent in academic publications. In the consulted version of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics,  
phronēsis is translated as wisdom. Elsewhere, for example in Kraut (2002) and in Barnes (1995) 
phronēsis is translated as practical wisdom. Personally, I believe that the latter translation is better in 
terms of grasping the essence of the original term as well as in distinguishing it with related concepts, for 
example for drawing the distinction between wisdom and understanding (see Hutchinson in Barnes, 1995, 
p. 207). Moreover, wisdom – instead of practical wisdom – might be misleading insofar as Aristotle’s use
of words does not necessarily correspond with the habitual language usage (cf. Gadamer, 1998, p. 8). 
Gadamer’s own translation is particularly interesting: here, phronēsis is translated as Vernünftigkeit 
[reasonability] or Gewissenhaftigkeit [conscientiousness] (Gadamer, 1998, p.14). In terms of the meaning 
of phronēsis and for the purpose of the following discussion, I feel that Gadamer’s translation is quite 
insightful, yet unfortunately somewhat impractical.
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namely technical expertise [technē], systematic knowledge [epistēmē], intellectual 
accomplishment [sophia] and – to a lesser extent – intelligence [nous].12
The first characteristic of practical wisdom we explore – that it is prescriptive 
and based on rationality – partially derives from what has already been said about the 
intellectual excellences. Practical wisdom is an intellectual excellence and all 
intellectual excellences – as opposed to the character-excellences – are of the rational 
part of the soul. Consequently, practical wisdom must be rational. But how can we 
explain that it is prescriptive? To deduce the prescriptive nature of phronēsis, let me 
introduce a further distinction. The part of the soul that possesses reason, however, can 
be separated into a scientific part and the calculative part, whereas the latter deals with 
things that can be otherwise and the former is about principles that cannot be otherwise 
(NE VI. 1, 1139a5-15). This distinguishes phronēsis from systematic knowledge. 
Systematic knowledge refers to things that cannot be otherwise, things that are by 
necessity (NE VI. 3, 1139b22-23). By contrast, phronēsis addresses the calculative part 
of the soul that deals with things that are not known, with things that can be otherwise. 
What the latter means is that there are alternatives and there is a search for truth among 
these alternatives by means of calculation, or better, deliberation13. Thus, the 
prescriptive force of practical wisdom derives from the fact that it is related to the 
calculative part of the soul and consequently involved in deliberating about best 
alternatives.14 Since rationality and prescription are essential for deliberation, and 
further, since phronēsis is characterized as being rational and prescriptive, we have 
learned that for Aristotle, it is precisely this intellectual virtue that allows us to 
deliberate well (NE VI. 5, 1140a25-26). But deliberate well about what?
A second characteristic of practical wisdom is that it approaches the “sphere of 
the human good” (NE VI. 5, 1140b21-22). Hence, apparently phronēsis allows us to 
deliberate well about a specific kind of subject, namely the human good.15 The person 
who possesses practical wisdom can not only deliberate well about what is good for 
                                               
12 Here, again, I rely in terms of translation on Rowe’s version of the Nicomachean Ethics; see reference 
list: (Aristotle, 2002).
13 Note that for Aristotle “deliberation and calculation are the same thing” (NE VI. 1, 1139a14).
14 This, however, does not mean that phronēsis is the only virtue that allows us to deliberate about best 
alternatives. What distinguishes it from other virtues such as intellectual accomplishment [sophia] is the 
object of deliberation, as we shall see.
15 Aristotle also makes this point earlier: “Well, it is thought characteristic of a wise person to be able to 
deliberate well about the things that are good and advantageous to him […].” (NE VI. 5, 1140a25-27).
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him, but also about “what is good for human beings in general” (NE VI. 6, 1140b9-
10).16 To clarify the matter, we may introduce intellectual accomplishment. Intellectual 
accomplishment – or sophia – differs from phronēsis insofar as it focuses on a distinct 
object. Possessing sophia does not imply having insights into what is good or bad for 
the human being. As Aristotle shows, the person who possesses sophia may be able to 
reflect on extraordinarily complex matters whose content is necessarily true, but 
nonetheless lack the capability to understand what is good for him.17 What is implicit 
here, as I believe, is that phronēsis covers ethical subjects. As opposed to intellectual 
accomplishment that may for example deal with mathematical problems or astronomy, 
practical wisdom is explicitly focused on the human well-being and therefore on matters 
of ethical relevance.
To grasp the meaning of the third characteristic of practical wisdom – namely 
that it is a disposition that “has to do with action” (NE VI. 7, 1141b16-17) – we must 
first explore what action really implies in the Aristotelian context. Firstly, action
indicates that something is set in motion18 to achieve something practical19 (NE VI. 2, 
1139a37-b1). What sort of something is achieved is, however, crucial. The end of action 
– as opposed to the end of production – must be “an end without qualification” (NE VI. 
2, 1139b3). When we talk about production, on the contrary, the end of it is “something 
distinct from the productive process” (NE VI. 5, 1140b8). This difference between 
action and production also separates phronēsis from technē. Whereas technical expertise 
has to do with things that have an external purpose and come into being for precisely 
this end, practical wisdom has to do with things that are an end in themselves, such as
doing well (NE VI. 4, 1140a11-a18; NE VI. 2, 1139b4). Secondly, the fact that 
phronēsis is related to action indicates that it also deals with particulars, because the 
                                               
16 For a more detailed account of the human good, see Chapter V.
17 Here, Aristotle mentions Anaxagoras and Thales as examples. Both would possess sophia but not 
phronēsis, because they know “things that exceptional, wonderful, difficult, even superhuman – but 
useless, because what they inquire into are not the goods that are human” (NE VI. 7, 1141b4-8). Yet, this 
does not imply that the practical wisdom is in principal more valuable or worthy than sophia (see 
Aristotle, 2002, p. 181; NE 1141a20-22).
18 The fact that practical wisdom relates to action illustrates a further distinction to intellectual 
accomplishment, because the latter merely consists of thought and “thought by itself sets nothing in 
motion” (NE VI. 2, 1139a36-37).
19 This is one reason why I believe the notion of practical wisdom as a translation for phronēsis is 
helpful.
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“sphere of action is constituted by particulars” (NE VI. 7, 1141b17).20 What does 
Aristotle mean by particulars? Particulars signify the opposite of universals, understood 
for example as elements of universal knowledge. Here, Aristotle’s vivid illustration is 
that knowing that light meat is easily digestible is a universal, whereas knowing what 
specific meat is light is a particular (NE VI. 7, 1141b18-23).21 This example and the 
general distinction between universals and particulars will be elementary for the further 
discussion. At this point, however, it is sufficient to point out that one characteristic of 
phronēsis is that it allows us to deliberate about particulars and consequently about 
things that are more concrete and specific than universals.
In the previous paragraphs, I have tried to point out the meaning of phronēsis as 
developed in Aristotle’s ethical treatise. The aim was to show that the necessary 
condition (1) at the core of our proposal for phronetic judgement is fulfilled; more 
precisely that the features of phronēsis correspond with what is required in political 
judgement. To render visible this analogy, recall that phronēsis is the intellectual virtue
that enables us to deliberate well on matters that have to do with the human good and 
the sphere of action. Further, recall the three characteristics of political judgement that 
have been uncovered above. First, political judgement is about choosing between 
alternative courses of action; the phronimos22 – the person who exercises practical 
wisdom – possesses the capacity to make a good choice as he can benefit from the 
rational, prescriptive nature of practical wisdom and therefore deliberate well. Secondly, 
that phronēsis enables us to deliberate well about the human good is analogous to what 
is needed in political judgement, being by definition about the “security and justice in a 
real community […]” (Ruderman, 1997, p. 410). Lastly, we have discussed political 
judgement as a phenomenon that is situational and requires the correspondent response 
of the agent to some sort of exceptional setting, concrete and immediate. The related
capacity also emerges from the excellence of practical wisdom, since it is related to
action and therefore to particulars; it is consequently an excellence that deals – beyond 
                                               
20 Also is in italics to emphasize that phronēsis does not exclusively deal with particulars, but with 
particulars and universals (NE VI. 7, 1141b15). As we have shown, practical wisdom means to know 
about the human good, and the human good clearly is a universal for Aristotle.
21 As this example illustrates, awareness of the universal can be useless without being aware of the 
particular. Consequently, Aristotle concludes that we need practical wisdom – that deals as we have seen 
with particulars – more than universal knowledge (NE VI. 7, 1141b22). 
22 The term phronimos does not appear in Rowe’s translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, but in other 
respects is often used (cf. Gadamer, 1998, p. 8). 
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the sphere of universals – with the situational. Based on these three analogies, it can be 
reasonably claimed that phronēsis provides the qualities relevant not only in judgement 
in general, but also with regard to the specific characteristics of political judgement and 
that consequently condition (1) is fulfilled.
The Validity of Phronetic Judgement
Having indicated the general applicability of phronēsis to political judgement on the 
phenomenological level, let us now turn to the normative aspect of phronetic
judgement, namely to the question what the exercise of phronēsis means for the validity 
of our political judgements. The proposal of phronetic judgement would be futile if 
there was no reason to believe that phronēsis enables us to make valid political 
judgements. Therefore, the latter has been established as the necessary condition (2) for 
our claim. What, then, makes it reasonable that exercising phronēsis would serve valid 
political judgement? As political judgement is about the “security and justice in a real 
community”, valid political judgement requires awareness of what is good for the 
community; and if phronēsis allows us to deal with issues concerning the human good, 
it serves the validity of political judgement. In fact, as we have examined, practical 
wisdom is related to the human good. But to properly deal with condition (2) we have to 
substantiate this view and clarify how one can comprehend this relation. Two aspects 
are crucial here.
First, it is a common position to interpret phronēsis as the intellectual virtue that 
is related to knowing what is good. Ruderman (1997), for example, states practical 
wisdom would “come into its own […] through the mind’s ability to grasp correctly the 
good for human beings” (p. 414). My problem here is that I perceive the notion of 
knowing about the good as somewhat imprecise or at least suggesting false views of the 
matter; in any case, possessing the knowledge – or having a grasp – of the human good 
is not sufficient for the purpose of political judgement. If this was the quality that comes 
with practical wisdom, surely we could consider the virtue as conducive to making true 
judgements in general. But, as I believe, this interpretation of practical wisdom is 
possibly misleading in the present discussion, because grasping or knowing what is 
good can wrongly suggest that we talk about something static or universal, whereas – as 
we have defined – political judgement often takes place in unexpected settings, is 
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situational and related to particulars. Concretely, I assert it is not plausible to think that
some sort of knowledge of the good has contributed to the correctness of Stanislav 
Petrov’s judgement. Let us then propose an interpretation of practical wisdom and its 
relation to the good that reasonably accounts for the specific characteristic of political 
judgement.
For Gadamer (1998), phronēsis is about the choice of the good23 (p.3). 
Emphasizing that practical wisdom enables humans to choose the good, rather than to 
know about the good evidently increases the relevance for political judgement. Again, 
recall the concrete case: Petrov had to deal with a problem of choice and not so much 
with a problem of knowledge. He faced the choice between assessing the alarm as true 
or false, and consequently between either reporting or ignoring the alarm. In that sense, 
Gadamer’s formulation is closer to the purpose of this investigation; and more 
importantly, it is also – as I suggest – closer to what Aristotle originally meant. In fact, 
Aristotle explicitly states that people who possess practical wisdom are “capable of 
forming a clear view of […] what is good for human beings in general” (NE VI. 5, 
1140b8-10).24 So, here phronēsis is characterized as more than the mere static
knowledge of what is good; rather, it must be perceived as an excellence that allows us 
to form a view of the good when there is a practical necessity.25 Hence, one who 
perceives phronēsis as being related to the capacity of grasping or knowing about the 
good fails to describe the true contribution of the virtue for the validity of political 
judgement. This value consists of the fact that practical wisdom enables the agent to
choose what is good in any particular situation – beyond grasping some static, logical 
universal good.26 That Aristotle understands phronēsis as being essential for forming the 
view of what is good emphasizes this aspect.
Let us move on to the second crucial aspect that emphasizes how phronēsis 
contributes to valid political judgement and begin with a critical remark. We have 
argued that phronēsis can serve the validity of political judgement, because it enables 
                                               
23 In terms of choice, Gadamer (1998) highlights the relation between phronēsis and prohairesis [decision] 
(p. 4); as I have tried to clarify the distinction in Chapter I, I leave this discussion aside at here.
24 Italics are not in the original text, but added by author to emphasize the word.
25 As we have seen phronēsis is never about logical universal and therefore explicitly distinct from 
scientific knowledge.
26 If I understand Gadamer (1986) correctly, he also tries to point out that practical wisdom – unlike 
knowledge – refers to situational choice, as phronēsis “in each instance is conscious of the rightness of its 
choice […]” (p. 171).
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the agent to make a good choice in the respective situation. And making a good choice –
as well as making true judgement – is a matter of ethics. So consequently, phronēsis
must be related to the sphere of ethics. But, so far we have not clarified how practical 
wisdom is linked to ethics. In fact, the word wisdom itself does not sufficiently illustrate 
its ethical relevance.
Consider Gadamer who repeatedly highlights the importance of practical 
wisdom for ethics and in particular for ethical practice. Gadamer’s translation of 
phronēsis is illuminating with regard to how he understands the virtue; for Gadamer 
(1998), phronēsis can be Vernünftigkeit [reasonability] or Gewissenhaftigkeit 
[conscientiousness] (p.14). As I believe, both terms indicate and emphasize the ethical 
substance of phronēsis to a large extent in comparison to translations such as wisdom or 
practical wisdom. The notion of conscientiousness is implicitly related to good practice 
and therefore per se related to the sphere of ethics. Also reasonability implies a strong 
relation to ethics as it is a sort of justice (NE V. 10, 1138a4-5);27 and what else is justice 
but a concept of right and wrong conduct and consequently of ethics? If Gadamer is 
right, his interpretation of phronēsis – manifest in the translation of the word itself –
supports our claim that we can perceive phronēsis as a virtue that directs us towards 
valid, good judgements because it is related to ethics. But then, we are confronted with 
a further problem. Assuming a relation to ethics, is it not puzzling that practical wisdom 
is part of the intellectual excellences, and explicitly not part of the excellences of ēthos 
[character]?
What appears to be contradictory at first sight may be solved by the following 
argument: That phronēsis in fact enables true, valid judgement and therefore is related 
to the sphere of ethics seems to be less a matter of the very substance of practical 
wisdom itself; it rather originates in the fact that practical wisdom and excellence of 
character are intrinsically tied to each other (Broadie, 2002, p. 17; Gadamer, 1998, p. 
17).28 The point is that character-excellence means to be able to choose intermediate 
                                               
27 What exactly - despite the supposed familiarity - distinguishes reasonability and justice is outlined in 
detail by Aristotle (see NE V. 10) and shall be discussed in Chapter V. At this stage, it is sufficient to 
show that reasonability, because it is related to justice, must be a concept of ethics.
28 Other interpretations go beyond my argument and suggest that even wisdom itself is an ethical virtue. 
For example Philippa Foot (1978) argues that “a man who lacks wisdom ‘has false values’, and that vices 
such as vanity and worldliness and avarice are contrary to wisdom in a special way” (p. 7). The point is 
that Foot perceives these vices as an outcome of a false judgement, and therefore a lack of wisdom. By 
contrast, our interpretation emphasises that these vices in the first place display a lack of ēthos. I believe 
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states between deficiency and excess. Further, character-excellence must be 
accompanied by rational prescription, which is – as we have seen earlier in this chapter 
– achieved by practical wisdom (NE II. 6, 1106b36-1107a4). Conversely, it is 
impossible to possess practical wisdom without excellence of character (NE VI. 13, 
1144a36-b1). So it can be concluded that practical wisdom – even though it is an 
intellectual virtue – enables ethical choice, or good judgement, as it always is 
conditional upon the personal ēthos and vice versa (Gadamer, 1998, p. 10).
With regard to the necessary condition (2), it can be stated that phronēsis 
contributes to the validity of political judgement as it allows us to form a view of what 
is good. This connection to ethical choice is also displayed by the link between 
phronēsis and ēthos. Further, if we are right in our discussion on condition (1), the 
phenomenology of phronetic judgement is sound as the characteristics of phronēsis 
correspond with what is required in political judgement and therefore make the virtue 
applicable. Both necessary conditions for our proposal on phronetic judgement are 
therefore fulfilled. What then remains to be shown in order to arrive at our proposal for 
phronetic judgement? First and foremost, we must uncover how precisely the 
established possibility of phronetic judgement can become a feasible mode of practical 
deliberation. We will regard this aspect in the subsequent chapter.
                                                                                                                                         
our reading is somewhat more modest, but in any case both interpretations enhance our claim on the 
ethical relevance of phronēsis.
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III. The Functioning of Phronetic Judgement
It is my intention to complete the proposal for exercising phronēsis in political 
judgement in this chapter. So far, we have only indicated the possibility of phronetic 
judgement based on the fact that the two necessary conditions are fulfilled, namely (1) 
that phronēsis is in principle applicable to political judgement and (2) that exercising 
phronēsis can ensure its validity. The sufficient condition to complete the proposal is 
now to demonstrate a plausible functioning of phronetic deliberation in political 
judgement. After establishing the proposal, some important qualifications will be 
discussed.
Phronetic Judgement as a Mode of Deliberation
If we are right and phronēsis can contribute to valid political judgement, the obvious 
question to be answered is how precisely this phronetic mode of deliberation can 
function. Such a mode of deliberation must account for the complexity and 
characteristic of political judgement and at the same time be plausible with regard to 
what exercising phronēsis entails. It was determined in the previous chapter that two 
characteristics of political judgement are its scope on the human good and its situational 
and immediate nature. We shall see that both characteristics render impossible the 
application of traditional modes of deliberation such as means-end deliberation and 
rule-case deliberation and call for our alternative approach.
Let us start with the ending of the previous chapter where we have argued that 
phronēsis and excellence of character are intrinsically tied. What, then, are their distinct 
contributions to mode of deliberation? Aristotle seems to be univocal here, stating that 
“excellence29 makes the goal correct, while wisdom30 makes what leads to it correct” 
(NE VI. 12, 1144a8-10). The following shall be named the standard reading of 
Aristotle’s mode of deliberation: apparently the character-excellences set the good ends
whereas practical wisdom directs the agent towards the good means to achieve these 
ends. According to Aristotle, practical reasoning must have an end and bad character 
would lead to distorted ends (NE VI. 12, 1144a35-36). By contrast, practical wisdom 
                                               
29 Here, excellence means more precisely the excellence of character, not the intellectual excellences (cf. 
Broadie, 2002, p. 49).
30 Here, wisdom stands for practical wisdom.
20
seems to be unrelated to the ends, or starting points of practical reasoning. Instead, what 
practical wisdom apparently does is to enable us to choose the good means to achieve 
ends that have been set by the excellences of character. This standard reading of means-
end deliberation may be plausible for what can be called technical deliberation.31
Consider the example Aristotle mentions. In fact, a “doctor does not deliberate about 
whether he’ll make his patients healthy” (NE III. 3, 1112b13-14). By contrast, a doctor 
does deliberate about the means to this end. That making the patients healthy is an end 
that is set by the doctor’s character, and deliberating about the appropriate means is a 
matter of practical wisdom is plausible.
Political judgement is yet not a sort of technical deliberation and therefore the 
application of the means-end deliberation is problematic. The problem derives from the 
fact that political judgement is initially about the human good and the latter is not a 
clearly formulated end. This becomes obvious if we recall the case of Stanislav Petrov. 
Instead of deliberating towards a concrete end – such as making the patient healthy - we 
are confronted with a judgement directed towards rather abstract concepts such as the 
good of the community. That vague manner in which we can describe what we want in 
political judgement makes this sort of deliberation non-technical (Wiggins, 1976, p. 38). 
Further, in absence of a clearly formulated end, we cannot perceive the deliberation in 
political judgement as being about a search for means (Wiggins, 1976, p. 38). 
Consequently, the standard reading of the means-end mode of deliberation – according 
to which deliberation through phronēsis is only about the means to an end that itself is 
set by character – is not plausible. Rather, as it seems, a moral agent like Petrov would 
first need to be able to identify a clearly formulated end. In other words, it appears that 
in political judgement one must in the first place deliberate about a specification of the 
initially rather vague end; and such a specification of the end would require practical 
wisdom (Wiggins, 1976, p. 41); but this virtue is according to the standard view on 
means-end deliberation only about the means. How can we respond to this paradox?
Concerning this problematic aspect in Aristotle’s theory authors have provided 
different ideas. Some claim that Aristotle in fact recognizes and tackles the problem of
his description of deliberation in chapter III of the Nicomachean Ethics and for that 
                                               
31 I borrow the distinction between technical and non-technical deliberation from Wiggins’ Deliberation 
and Practical Reason, see Wiggins (1976).
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purpose deviates from this strict means-end mode of deliberation in later chapters where 
he would provide an alternative mode, namely rule-case deliberation (cf. Wiggins, 
1976). Wiggins (1976) rejects claims about this allegedly intended distinction between 
means-end and rule-case deliberation in Aristotle (p. 40) and I am inclined to believe 
that Wiggins is right. But regardless of whether Aristotle intended to introduce this 
alternative rule-case mode of deliberation, it is in any case just as little useful for 
political judgement as the standard means-end mode. To render visible why rule-case 
deliberation does not function for political judgement, recall that the setting and 
circumstances an agent faces in political judgement are per definition situational and 
immediate; therefore, political judgement is about matters too exceptional to be solvable 
through simple application of a rule. The complex nature of political judgement 
precisely consists of the fact that it cannot always be addressed by trivial rules.
Like proponents of the notion of rule-case deliberation, also Broadie seems to be 
at odds with the standard reading of Aristotle’s means-end deliberation model. But 
instead of the rule-case alternative, Broadie suggests a different solution to the puzzle. 
Because she finds the view that practical wisdom is not assessing the good end and 
equally that character is irrelevant for determining the means simply “absurd” (Broadie, 
2002, p. 49), Broadie tries to develop a different interpretation of Aristotle’s means-end 
deliberation. In fact, Broadie’s interpretation is less restrictive than the classical means-
end mode in a sense that it demonstrates how character can also be directed to means 
and practical wisdom also to ends.32 Yet, two problems make Broadie’s interpretation 
not helpful for our project. First, also this interpretation implies the same problem for an 
application to political judgement as the standard reading; because also Broadie grounds 
her account in the view that the starting point of deliberation is an end that is “some 
specific, empirical, object of wish O” (Broadie, 2002, p. 49); in political judgement, as 
we have seen, such a clear end cannot be formulated at the beginning of the 
deliberation. Second, Broadie does not provide a plausible answer why – assuming her 
interpretation of the mode of deliberation is correct – Aristotle would have formulated 
the means-end deliberation in the strict way he did. In that sense, her account fails to 
explain how it can be reconciled with what Aristotle literally wrote about deliberation in 
chapter III of the ethical treatise. What would be more promising is an approach on 
                                               
32 For Broadie’s interpretation in detail, see (Broadie, 2002, pp. 49).
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deliberation that accounts for the concrete characteristics of political judgement and is at 
the same time reconcilable with Aristotle’s passage on deliberation.
For a solution to this puzzle, let us consider Wiggins’ proposal on deliberation 
formulated in Deliberation and Practical Reason. As we will see, it takes two 
modifications to make phronetic judgement a plausible mode of deliberation. First, I 
will develop a mode of deliberation and formulate the respective syllogism that is 
distinct from both, means-end deliberation and rule-case deliberation. The second 
modification will replace the standard reading of Aristotle’s means-end deliberation.
To start with the first modification, recall the previously mentioned modes of 
deliberation. The logic of rule-case deliberation can be expressed in the following 
syllogism: the respective action is concluded by deductive deliberation in which the 
major premiss consists of a rule and the minor premiss of a particular, true instance.33
We have discussed, however, that political judgement requires a sort of deliberation that 
cannot always be solved with reference to rules. Thus, let us move on to the syllogism 
that reflects the standard means-end deliberation. Here, the action derives from a major 
premiss that expresses the end, and a minor premiss that expresses a mean to this end.34
The problem of this sort of deliberation for our project was that it requires clearly 
formulated ends; and in political judgement the end is not clearly formulated and 
requires deliberation itself. In light of the inapplicability of both modes, we will now 
develop an alternative formulation of an action-syllogism. For this project, Wiggins’ 
idea is illuminating. He describes the Aristotelian syllogism as follows: the practical 
conclusion derives from a major premiss that pertains to some good, and a minor 
premiss that pertains to the possible (Wiggins, 1976, p. 40). This formulation of the 
action-syllogism allows for deliberation in terms of political judgement as it in fact 
accounts for the latter’s two – and in terms of the standard view on means-end 
deliberation and rule-case deliberation problematic – characteristics. First, it accounts 
for the fact that the end of deliberation in political judgement is not clearly formulated; 
                                               
33 To illustrate rule-case syllogism we can consider the walk-syllogism Aristotle provides in the treatise 
De motu animalium (cf. Wiggins, 1976, p. 39). That every man ought to walk displays a rule and the 
major premiss. The particular instance manifest in the minor premiss is that I am a man. The logic results 
in the conclusion, or better action, that I immediately walk.
34 Again, consider as an example for a means-end syllogism Aristotle’s De motu animalium (cf. Wiggins, 
1976, p. 39): My end is that I need a covering and manifests the major premiss. That a cloak is a covering 
is the minor premiss. Therefore a cloak is a mean to the end of having a covering and as a result my 
action is to get a cloak.
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what the major premiss states, is that the end of deliberation is some good. Second, 
Wiggins’ formulation of the action-syllogism considers the truth that political 
judgement is situational and immediate; the minor premiss pertains to the possible and 
therefore to the “feasibility in the particular situation to which the syllogism is applied” 
(Wiggins, 1976, p. 40).35 So I suggest that we use Wiggins’ action-syllogism for 
deliberation in political judgement and that it follows this scheme:
Major Premiss: To judge with regard to some good.
Minor Premiss: To judge with regard to the possible given the situation. 
Conclusion: To take an action and judge.
It remains to be shown how precisely this alternative mode of deliberation on political 
judgement – that we name phronetic judgement – can function. To illustrate how the 
previously mentioned action-syllogism functions in the practice of political judgement, 
we can draw on Wiggins’ theory of practical reason (cf. Wiggins, 1976, p. 43): 
confronted with political judgement, our starting point is to find out what to do in a 
particular situation. Our end is not more precise than the good and establishes the major 
premiss. We have seen that this end is too vague to begin with means-end deliberation. 
Hence, we need what Wiggins (1976) calls “deliberative specification” (p. 44). In more 
detail, we must specify our end with regard to the minor premiss that mentions what is 
possible in the given situation. Only when this specification is reached, we can 
deliberate about the appropriate means and choose for a course of action in the political 
judgement (cf. Wiggins, 1976, p. 38).
Thus, Wiggins’ action-syllogism renders possible our proposal: phronēsis can be 
exercised in political judgement and we shall call this mode of practical deliberation 
phronetic judgement. Character-excellence would then set the end as formulated in the 
major premiss. It ensures that our starting point for phronetic judgement is to aim at the 
good. The task of phronēsis is to enable us to deliberate well about the appropriate 
means. But additionally, as we have shown, the specification of the end is also a 
deliberative, intellectual process and therefore requires our practical wisdom. We will 
                                               
35 Wiggins (1976) calls this peculiar aspect “situational appreciation” and related it to Aristotle’s concept 
of aisthēsis [perception] (p. 43).
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return to and elaborate in more detail on functioning of our action-syllogism in the 
subsequent chapters, but we shall first present some important qualifications on our 
proposal starting with the above mentioned second modification.
Some Qualifications
We have now modified the standard mode of deliberation to make it applicable in 
political judgement. An essential part of this modification was that phronēsis helps the 
agent to specify the initially vague end of deliberation stated in the major premiss. I 
have hinted the necessity to draw a second modification in order to make our proposal 
of phronetic judgement reconcilable with what Aristotle states. Indeed, one might object 
that the idea that phronēsis specifies the end is a contradiction with Aristotle’s idea of 
its role in the means-end deliberation.
My reply to this is that we can in fact reconcile the role phronēsis plays in our 
mode of deliberation with Aristotle’s view. First, let us clarify the issue: according to 
our mode of deliberation phronēsis is not only directed to the means and this allegedly 
contradicts Aristotle’s central claim that phronēsis enables us to choose the correct 
means whereas ends are set by our character-excellence (NE VI. 12, 1144a8-10). The 
origin of Aristotle’s view might be that phronēsis is about deliberating well; and – as we 
learn in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics – we only deliberate about “the things that 
forward the end” (NE III. 5, 1113b4). I believe the problem we face can be solved 
through a second modification that simply avoids a misreading of the latter passage;
because deliberation – and consequently phronēsis – is not limited to means for 
Aristotle, but – at least in the consulted translation – it is literally limited to “things that 
forward the end”. And, we might err when we equate the meaning of “things that 
forward the end” with our understanding of means. Again, Wiggins provides a helpful 
idea. Apparently, the same peculiar reading is possible in the original – meaning not 
translated – version of Aristotle’s ethical treatise. For Wiggins (1976), Aristotle’s 
limitation on the scope of deliberation can be translated as being of “what is towards the 
end” [pros to telos] (p. 32). True, this can be read as an expression for means. But it 
appears equally plausible to read the passage (“what is towards the end”) as indicating 
things “whose existence counts in itself as the partial or total realization of the end”; as 
such, these things would be constituents of the end (Wiggins, 1976, pp. 32).
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Concretely, in the case of political judgement, the end would be the good and set 
by the character-excellences. The necessary specification of the end aims to bear its 
constituents with regard to what is possible in the particular situation. So what we really 
deliberate about in phronetic judgement is not the vague end, but the constituents of this
end and therefore phronetic judgement does not contradict Aristotle’s means-end logic.
To substantiate this thought, let us briefly resume Gadamer’s view on the scope 
of phronēsis. Also Gadamer (1998) is critical about limiting the scope of practical 
wisdom to means and instead he maintains its contribution to good ends (p. 17; p. 19). 
Gadamer does not explicitly refer to the role of phronēsis in the deliberative 
specification of the end, but I believe his thought is related ours. Deficiencies, 
sentiments and emotions constantly endanger our focus towards the good in life, be it 
good conduct in general, or good choice in making political judgements in particular. 
But what comes into force when our good ends are most vulnerable? According to 
Gadamer, phronēsis enables us to keep the good in view, to adhere to the good despite 
our permanent, unreasonable desires (Gadamer, 1998, p. 19; p. 9). This view also 
advocates our notion of phronēsis that does not limit its scope merely on means. Also 
Gadamer does not contradict the Aristotelian view that ends are set by the character, but 
at the same time he seems to embrace the view that phronēsis can be, in some way, 
directed to ends or better to its constituents.
So far we have mainly discussed the contribution of phronēsis to one’s ability to 
deliberate well and eventually make good political judgement that derives from the 
virtues’ rational force.36 In fact, the rationalists’ branch of moral philosophy represents 
the view that moral judgements express reason, and not sentiment (Broadie, 2002, p. 
51). Regarding the reason-sentiment debate, I shall now demonstrate that neither 
Aristotle’s theory nor our proposal on phronetic judgement is tending towards the 
rationalists’ view; on the contrary, our proposal reflects a rather balanced position with 
respect to the reason-sentiment-debate. Two arguments appear to be relevant to 
emphasize the importance of non-rational elements.
                                               
36 Broadie (2002) deals with the question why Aristotle himself does not express the importance of the 
non-rational elements more explicitly and suspects that Aristotle’s emphasis on the rationality in practical 
wisdom originates in his attempt to “win more social respect for the theoretical employment of reason” 
(p. 52) in showing that both, the well-respected phronēsis as well as the to-be-respected theoretical 
knowledge, would share a common rationality.
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First, recall the intrinsic link between practical wisdom and other excellences. 
We have seen that next to phronēsis, also the excellences of character that are not of to 
the rational part of the soul are essential to phronetic judgement. And, for example 
Nussbaum (1986) affirms that the excellence of character is a disposition that implies 
the notion of appropriate passion (p. 308). We have said that phronetic judgement is 
conditional upon phronēsis and character-excellence, and that phronēsis is conditional 
upon character-excellence and vice versa. Having shown that non-rational elements 
such as passion are – of course always to the appropriate degree and never in excess –
implied in the excellence of character, one can conclude that phronetic judgement and 
even practical wisdom itself must be related to passion and therefore partly to the non-
rational.
The second aspect that uncovers the relevance of non-rational elements in 
phronetic judgement is visible when we consider the importance of perception
[aisthēsis] for phronetic judgement. Recall what the minor premiss of our action-
syllogism states, namely what is possible in the particular situation of political 
judgement. To get a grasp of what is possible, to see “the relevant features of the
situation” is not simple; the agent needs – as Wiggins has called it – “situational 
appreciation” which is what Aristotle calls perception (Wiggins, 1976, p. 43). So 
perception is an elementary part of the phronetic judgement, and as perception is clearly 
non-rational37, we can confirm the importance of non-rational elements for our 
proposal.38 Next to the importance of perception within the deliberative process of 
phronetic judgement, the non-rational elements are also crucial in acquiring the virtue 
phronēsis itself. The point is that it is the non-rational part – for example intuition – that 
enables us to recognize the situations and human beings that are relevant for the 
development of our excellence in good judgement (Blaug, 2000, p. 193). Further and at 
an even more elementary level, it is the non-rational force that is crucial for our very 
                                               
37 See for example Aristotle’s statement that also “brute animals have perception” (NE VI. 2, 1139a20).
38 Even beyond our specific focus on phronetic judgement, for Aristotle there is apparently a necessary 
connection between the non-rational perception and the rational phronēsis because “wisdom has as its 
object what comes last [in the process of deliberation], and this is […] an object of […] perception” (NE 
VI. 8, 1142a27-28). The point is interesting but has not been included in the argument as it remained 
unclear to the author how precisely non-rational perception is related to “what comes last in the process of 
deliberation”.
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motivation to become excellent (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 307).39 But to better understand 
these arguments related to the importance of the non-rational elements for acquiring
practical wisdom, we must now present how one can become excellent in phronetic 
judgement.
Aristotle’s project is first and foremost directed towards practice, and also this 
investigation wishes to elaborate on real-life ethical conduct; thus it would be irritating 
to leave out the most practical qualification to our proposal on phronetic judgement, 
namely to clarify how one can acquire the relevant excellence to apply this mode of 
deliberation. It has been discussed that both, practical wisdom and character-excellence 
are required and have their distinct functions for the action-syllogism. Excellences of 
character and excellences of intellect are also distinct in the way how we can acquire 
each of them. In terms of the character-excellences, Aristotle postulates that practice 
allows us to develop the hexis [disposition] to be – for example – moderate or 
courageous. It is thus a matter of habituation to be brought to completion in terms of 
character-excellence [NE II. 1, 1103a25]. Yet, in terms of acquiring the intellectual 
excellences – and therefore also in terms of acquiring practical wisdom – humans rely 
on teaching; for that reason, Aristotle also advises us to “pay attention to the 
[judgements] of experienced and older people, […] because they have an eye, formed 
by experience” (NE VI. 12, 1143b10-14). Again, one must acquire both dispositions in 
order to be able to exercise phronetic judgement. It seems plausible that, as Broadie 
(2002) suggests, “in concrete reality [practical] wisdom often grows up alongside [the 
acquirement of character-excellence]” (p. 51). Yet, what is crucial is to recognize the 
distinct nature of the process. Whereas the acquisition of character-excellence relies on 
practice and therefore first and foremost on the agent himself, phronēsis is dependent on 
the lessons one learns from observing others. The more and better one observes wise 
people, the more likely he becomes wise himself. In other words, whereas we must act
virtuously to develop excellence of character, phronēsis requires us to experience. 
                                               
39 One further argument for the relevance of the non-rational for exercising phronēsis is mentioned by 
Nussbaum. As prohairesis [choice] is not discussed within this paper, the argument is somehow out of 
context but nonetheless interesting. Nussbaum (1986) argues that choice, which is necessarily involved in 
judgement, is “an ability that is on the borderline between the intellectual and the passional, partaking of 
both natures: it can be described as either desiderative deliberation or deliberative desire. So too, practical 
wisdom functions in close connection with the correctly disposed passions” (p. 308).
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Therefore, to what extent one possesses phronēsis and is capable of phronetic 
judgement is strongly linked to one’s experience.
In this chapter, we have established the proposal for phronetic judgement. By 
means of a modified action-syllogism we have explained how phronetic judgement can 
function and moreover qualified the proposal, emphasizing the relevance of non-rational 
elements and experience for good phronetic judgement. Recall Stanislav Petrov who 
found himself in the complex situation I have introduced as a real-life example for 
political judgement and let me round off this chapter with a note on the denouement of 
the his story: Petrov – instead of reporting the alarm to the military and political 
leadership – concluded on his own authority that it must be a false alarm resulting from 
a malfunctioning satellite (The Guardian, 2008). As we know today, Petrov’s judgement 
was true. What was identified as U.S. intercontinental missiles attacking the Soviet 
Union was in reality an accumulation of clouds.
Whether Petrov’s political judgement was based on the exercise phronēsis, in 
other words, whether one can perceive the valid judgement made by Petrov as an 
endorsement of our proposal remains speculative. For the lack of sufficient information, 
an empirical claim on how the lieutenant colonel really deliberated must not be 
established. Possibly, Petrov did not even deliberate and the valid judgement was 
merely luck. Nonetheless, as I believe, the information that is available reveals 
interesting resemblances between phronetic judgement and what Stanislav Petrov did.
When the Russian lieutenant colonel was asked how he arrived at the true judgement 
that the reported missiles must be a false alarm, Petrov claimed it would have been 
mostly “gut instinct” (Spiegel Online, 2010). Thus, apparently a non-rational element –
we can call it gut feeling, intuition, or maybe perception – played a role in Petrov’s 
political judgement. But the Man Who Saved the World40 did not exclusively follow his 
intuition. He also used the few minutes time that were available to reason on some 
concrete arguments and to recall his experiences; as report show, Petrov considered 
aspects such as the possible motive behind the supposed U.S. aggression and moreover 
recalled lessons from his military education (cf. Spiegel Online, 2010). Is it not 
plausible to read the latter aspects as the sort of rational prescription and experience that 
                                               
40 The Man Who Saved the World is the title of a documentary on Stanislav Petrov and the events on 
September 26, 1983.
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we identified as characteristics of practical wisdom? Regardless of whether Petrov was 
a phronimos or not, we can – based on the findings I have presented so far – establish
phronetic judgement as an appropriate mode of deliberation in situations such as the one 
Petrov faced.
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IV. Phronetic Judgement and Ethics
Our proposal advocating phronetic judgement must not be an isolated claim; its
plausibility is conditional upon our approval of related Aristotelian notions. Hitherto, 
we have for example demonstrated that phronetic judgement requires phronēsis and the 
character-excellences; moreover, we have learned about the importance to uphold 
Aristotle’s distinctions, e.g. between the rational and non-rational part of the soul, and 
so on. Hence, it appears our claim for phronetic judgement attaches us to some extent to
the broader Aristotelian theory. At the same time, our proposal might imply that we 
detach ourselves from other approaches to ethical theory. After all, there is nothing 
wrong if a proposal’s features contradict other approaches on the field; conversely, as I 
would maintain, it is even desirable to be able to identify distinguishable aspects.
Therefore, this chapter aims to uncover what is different about phronetic 
judgement in relation to further ethical accounts. I will begin by providing an overview 
of what can be considered the most influential ethical theories and defend this
categorization against a critique raised by Martha C. Nussbaum (cf. Nussbaum, 1999).
Based on these insights we will be able to demonstrate the distinguishable features 
between other ethical theories and phronetic judgement and moreover how the latter’s 
characteristics enhance its appeal for the situational aspect of political judgement.
Finally, and with regard to the debate between particularists and universalists, it will be 
shown that phronetic judgement can be interpreted as a principled account to ethics.
On Rival Ethical Theories
The question I wish to answer now is to what extent our proposal on phronetic 
judgement is distinguishable from prominent ethical theories other than Aristotelian 
virtue ethics, assuming our claim is most familiar to the latter. Such a categorization is 
at odds with Nussbaum’s argument that virtue ethics is not even a permissible, but 
instead a “misleading category” within ethical theory (Nussbaum, 1999). So we begin 
with a brief rebuttal to Nussbaum’s critique in order to defend the categorization we 
employ.
There are two claims at the core of Nussbaum’ scepticism towards the category 
of virtue ethics. First, the category is rejected because there would be no such thing as a 
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unitary approach called virtue ethics; in addition, those ethicists who subscribe to virtue 
ethics would fail to recognize that the latter cannot be usefully contrasted with other 
prominent ethical theories (Nussbaum, 1999, pp. 200; Nussbaum, 1999, p. 168).
To start with my reply to the first criticisms: Nussbaum’s point is that we can 
identify substantially different strands within what is called virtue ethics and a 
consequently thin “common ground” among virtue ethicists (Nussbaum, 1999, pp. 168-
170). I consider the latter descriptions right, but insufficient to argue for dropping virtue 
ethics as a category. Whether all elements associated within a category have extensive 
or little common substance is subordinate in terms of the category’s validity. All 
elements commonly categorized as animate beings share much less common substance 
than those we categorize as man.41 The category of animate beings, however, is just as 
relevant as the category of man. The validity of category depends first and foremost on 
whether all its elements share some common feature, not on how many features these 
elements have in common. So, even if there is only a thin “common ground” among 
virtue ethicists, we must not conclude that the category itself is irrelevant; what is 
decisive is that we can identify such a common ground, and in fact Nussbaum herself 
does.
The essence of Nussbaum’s second point of critique on the category of virtue 
ethics addresses its supposed lack of distinctiveness. It is claimed that virtue ethics – or 
precisely its thin “common ground” – could also be pursued within other ethical 
theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 165, p. 201). This 
claim is substantiated by presenting several examples of Kantians and utilitarians that 
accommodate elements of virtue ethics. But Nussbaum ignores the necessity to show 
that reversely, also proponents of virtue ethics could consistently accommodate Kantian 
or utilitarian reasoning. Therefore, I believe also Nussbaum’s second critique is not 
adequate to deduce strong claims, such as to “do away with the category of virtue ethics 
in teaching and writing” (Nussbaum, 1999, p. 201). Nonetheless, an insightful lesson 
from Nussbaum’s argument is to be aware that – when we talk of these categories – we 
talk of generalizations and tend to leave aside details and different definitions or
interpretations. Having this in mind, let us sketch the characteristics of virtue ethics and 
                                               
41 The category of animate beings contains all organisms that are capable of voluntary movement, 
whereas the category of man embraces organisms that have apparently significantly more in common.
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its rival ethical theories in order to be able to identify the distinguishable features of 
phronetic judgement in the next subchapter. 
In terms of theorizing ethics, two dominant approaches are consequentialism and 
deontology.42 The former is commonly associated with the view that the end of moral 
action is central and prior43 to its content; by contrast, deontology emphasizes the 
importance of the content of moral action (McDonald, 1978, p. 7). In terms of modern 
ethics, utilitarianism advocates the consequentialist view whereas proponents of 
Kantian moral philosophy tend to argue on the basis of deontology (Larmore, 1996, p. 
21; Nussbaum, 1999, p. 164). Hence, broadly speaking, one distinguishing feature 
between the so-called enlightenment ethics – hence between utilitarianism and 
Kantianism – consists of the priority of the right and the good. The end of action – the 
good – is central in utilitarianism whereas Kant and his followers emphasize the priority 
of the notion of the right over the good.44 What both schools of thought share is that 
their conceptions of ethics centre some sort of “moral ought”; it is in Kantianism 
expressed through the notion of moral duty, in utilitarianism manifest in the 
unconditional command that one “ought” to do what is in the best interest of all 
(Larmore, 1996, p. 22).45
The notion of a “moral ought” is not necessarily absent in virtue ethics. As 
Larmore (1996) shows, the notion of virtue can be understood “as the disposition to do 
                                               
42 Here, I do not discuss discourse ethics as advocated by Habermas. Discourse ethics specify that some 
outcome is ethically valid if “the procedure by which it was attained was deliberative, rational, fair and 
open to all concerned” (Blaug, 2000, p. 182). Hence, the idea is to consider something ethical if it was 
achieved by and ethical procedure. For our discussion on political judgement, I consider discourse ethics 
of no, or little avail; because the moral agent in political judgement does not have the opportunity to 
employ a decision procedure that is discourse-based and “open to all concerned”. The problem is evident 
if we recall Petrov’s case, in which it was practically impossible to initiate a discourse with everyone who 
is affected by the judgement, which would have been basically millions of people. 
43 What sort of priority between the end and the means, the good and the right, utilitarianism establishes 
remains somewhat vague. At first McDonald argues that the telos would be prior to the content of moral 
judgement in terms of validity (see: McDonald, 1978, p. 7). Later, the author hints that utilitarianism 
would “derive the right from the good” (McDonald, 1978, p. 13), which goes, as I believe, beyond the 
first statement as it establishes a logical link between both terms. For the purpose of this investigation, 
however, this must not be further specified.
44 This is the common and as I believe accurate generalization of one main difference between 
utilitarianism and Kantianism. It is worth noting, however, that there are different view, For example 
Larmore (1996) confirms that in Kantianism the good is to be defined after and by means of the law, 
hence the right, but claims that this is not a distinguishing feature with respect to utilitarians; instead, both 
would be deontological theories (p. 22).
45 Again, it must be emphasized that we only sketch general characteristics and cannot consider all 
different branches within utilitarianism or Kantian ethics.
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what one ought to do […]” (p. 25). 46 Yet, one crucial difference is that virtue is at the 
centre of virtue ethics; and even interpreted as an alternative form of a “moral ought”, 
virtue differs because it is intrinsically valuable.47 In other words, virtue is promoted 
“for its own sake” (Larmore, 1996, p. 25), whereas the “moral oughts” of the 
enlightenment ethics do not display this intrinsic value; they are always formulated for 
the sake of something else, be it the good of all in utilitarianism or a sense of duty in 
Kantianism. As McDonald (1978) puts it, virtue ethics – as opposed to utilitarianism 
and Kantian morality – seek to “judge excellent character, rather than good objectives or 
right duties” (p. 7). Determining the moral correctness of an action is permuted from 
being a matter of obligation or calculation to a matter within the action itself; it is 
focused on the moral agent himself and in particular on assessing how virtuously he 
performs.48 What these general differences bring out is that virtue ethics is a distinct and 
therefore plausible category; they also suggest why authors such as MacIntyre (1981) 
perceive virtue ethics as a real alternative to the enlightenment ethics (p.111).
It appears that virtue ethics are easier to distinguish in relation to Kantianism 
than to utilitarianism. First, it is characteristic of Kantian ethics to formulate rules or 
dictates. For Kantians, what ought to be done derives from an unconditional imperative 
(Foot, 1978, p. 157). By contrast, virtue ethics and Aristotle’s approach in particular do 
not offer such substantive rules (Kraut, 1989, p. 37). Additionally, the notion of moral 
wrongness is central in Kantianism but absent in Aristotle’s ethical treatise (Kraut, 
2007, p. 28). Instead of rules or dictates about moral rightness, virtue ethics put 
emphasis on “the character of the inner moral life” of the respective agent (Nussbaum, 
1999, p. 170). Lastly – as opposed to Kantian ethics – it is characteristic for virtue ethics 
to advocate the centrality of the good for moral judgement.
With regards to the latter point – the centrality of the good – there is an 
unquestionable resemblance between virtue ethics and utilitarianism. Nonetheless, there 
are two significant distinctions in addition to the general differences between virtue 
ethics and enlightenment ethics mentioned above. Utilitarians examine the good in 
                                               
46 Italics added by the author to highlight the core of Larmore’s statement.
47 Of course, virtues do also have the instrumental value that they are for the sake of the good.
48 This might be one reason why Nussbaum defines Aristotle’s ethics as anthropocentric (see: Nussbaum, 
1986, p. 400).
34
terms of its quantity and with the aim to maximize it (Kraut, 2007, p. 12).49 Both aspects 
appear to be alien to virtue ethics. First, the idea of quantifying the good is at odds with 
the idea of virtue ethics, for Aristotle explicitly states, one must not expect precision in 
ethics in general (Kraut, 1989, p. 37). A virtue ethicist’s view cannot be reconciled with 
an approach to measure or quantify what ethics is about, namely the good. The same 
argument can be used to show the distinct views on maximizing the good. To maximize 
the good, we must be able to quantify it. As has been argued, virtue ethics reject to 
quantify the good. Therefore, the aim to maximizing the good must be incompatible 
with virtue ethics. Gottlieb (2009) confirms this point stating that the good is in 
Aristotle’s view “not the sort of thing that can be maximized” (p. 141). So, despite the 
focus on the notion of the good, virtue ethics do not explicitly share utilitarianism’s 
“concern for the greatest happiness of the greatest number […]” (Foot, 1978, p. 92). To 
sum up, I believe to have substantiated my view that the category virtue ethics to which 
our proposal on phronetic judgement is attached is in fact a plausible one and 
distinguishable from the enlightenment ethics. 
Phronetic Judgement and Enlightenment Ethics
Having explored the distinctive features between the enlightenment ethics and the sort 
of moral philosophy to which our proposal is related – namely virtue ethics – we may 
now narrow our scope of investigation and focus on political judgement and reveal the 
peculiar characteristics of phronetic judgement in relation to the utilitarian or Kantian 
modes of reasoning. Those who promote the exercise of phronēsis more generally and 
beyond the sphere of political judgement have often linked their arguments to sharp 
criticisms on the morals of modernity including the “rigidity of modern rationalism” or
the “instrumentalization of reason” (Ruderman, 1997, p. 409; Tabachnick, 2004, p. 
997). I believe such claims miss the point; the supposed opposition between phronēsis 
and the enlightenment ethics’ emphasis on reason appears to be erroneous, for phronēsis 
must not be perceived as an “antidote to reason” (Ruderman, 1997, p. 409). What really
makes phronēsis and phronetic judgement distinct from Kantian or utilitarian 
approaches can by no means be originated in the emphasis on reason. First and 
                                               
49 Again, it is worth noting that we must generalize here. Not all utilitarians advocate a view about 
maximizing the good. John Stuart Mill, for example, rejects such an idea (cf. Kraut, 2007).
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practically, it would be fallacious to believe that good judgement can “be left to mere 
instinct or intuition” (Tabachnick, 2004, p. 1003). And second, exactly rational 
prescription and the quality to deliberate or reason well have been key qualities of the 
agent that exercises phronēsis. Thus, to illuminate what in fact are the distinct features 
of exercising phronēsis and of phronetic judgement, we should look at three aspects 
namely the mode of deliberation’s intention, sources and procedure.
The first point that distinguishes phronetic judgement from deontological and 
utilitarian ethics is manifest already in the very intention. In encouraging phronēsis in 
political judgement we intend to enable humans to do “the right thing, in the right way, 
and at the right time” (Aristotle in Nyberg, 2007, p. 590). This characteristic is in 
contrast to the Kantian and utilitarian intention to formulate universal ethics (cf. 
Larmore, 1996) and has been discussed as a particular strength of our proposal. Recall 
Stanislav Petrov. His judgement to not report the alarm to the higher authorities was 
true; but only in this particular situation. Apparently, Petrov did “the right thing, in the 
right way, and at the right time” in line with our approach. It is hardly imaginable that 
other approaches that intent to develop universal ethics can account for such situations.
Let us turn to the sources of phronetic judgement. By sources I mean the factors 
that contribute to a certain mode of reasoning for the purpose of judgement such as 
desire, reason, rules, and so on. Is it not true that a promising account of political 
judgement must incorporate that the human condition – also in its capacity to judge –
requires laws and rules as well as desire and intuition? Gadamer calls this dualism the 
tension between convention and nature and suggests that phronēsis constitutes its 
remedy (Gadamer in Tabachnick, 2004, p. 1003). Yet, present state-of-affairs ethics 
show a tendency towards the side of convention at the cost of nature, resulting in a 
“growing scope of not-to-be-compromised rights” (Ruderman, 1997, p. 410). Such a 
rule-based sort of ethics would, as I suspect, not have encouraged Stanislav Petrov to 
judge correctly. We have already reviewed that Petrov based his judgement on other 
factors such as intuition – what he himself called “gut-feeling” – and eventually decided 
to even compromise a rule, namely the rule consisting of the command to immediately 
report alarms to the authorities. We should therefore support Gadamer’s thought and 
highlight the capacity of phronēsis to aim for a balance between multiple factors as 
sources for deliberation. In doing so, phronēsis and phronetic judgement to a larger 
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extent than enlightenment ethics accounts for the tension that Gadamer described as a 
polarity between convention and nature.
Also in terms of the envisaged procedure of judging, we can identify a 
remarkable feature of phronetic judgement compared to the enlightenment ethics. 
Kantians and utilitarians, as Larmore emphasizes, agree in searching for a “fully explicit 
decision procedure for settling moral questions” (Larmore in Albertzart, 2013, p. 140).
Regardless of its feasibility, this ideal is not even desirable for the viewpoint of a 
proponent of phronetic judgement. First, such an “explicit decision procedure” for 
political judgement would be at odds with the previously mentioned emphasis on 
intuition in phronetic judgement; moreover, this alleged ideal contradicts the very task 
of practical wisdom, namely to enable and encourage “decision-making according to 
one’s own responsibility” (Gadamer in Tabachnick, 2004, p. 1004). Is it not true that 
precisely Stanislav Petrov’s courage to take responsibility and act on his own authority 
in the exceptional circumstances has let him to making the valid judgement? Thus, 
phronetic judgement rejects the ideal of a fixed procedure to make political judgement, 
but recognizes to a degree the agent’s ability to settle the problems with his very own 
capacity to deliberate.
It was the aim of the previous subchapters to show that – at first – virtue ethics 
and – in this subchapter – phronetic judgement feature characteristics that are peculiar 
and significantly different from what rival ethical theories comprise. We have examined 
that phronetic judgement as a mode of deliberation differs not so much regarding the 
importance of reason, but rather in terms of intention, sources for deliberation, and 
procedure; broadly speaking, it aims at situational instead of universal ethics, pays more 
attention to intuition instead of convention or rule, and finally rejects the ideal of a fixed 
decision procedure for moral judgements. The critic might object that these 
characteristics of phronetic judgement imply the risk of purporting an arbitrary ethics. 
Admittedly, emphasizing the situation instead of the universal, one’s intuition instead of 
conventions or rules, and the decision-making power of the agent instead of fixed 
decision procedures at least nourishes such a critic’s concern. In the following, I will 
seize the matter and argue that phronetic judgement is despite the above mentioned 
characteristics not an arbitrary ethics, but a principled account.
37
Phronetic Judgement and Moral Principles
I have mentioned at the end of the previous subchapter the concern that our proposal on 
exercising phronēsis in political judgement would imply a tendency to a sort of 
arbitrary, non-principled ethics. Accordingly, it should be discussed whether promoting 
phronetic judgement means to renounce the idea of moral principles. From the 
viewpoint of what is commonly labelled as particularism, this does not even illustrate a 
serious concern. As particularists assert, there is no such thing as valid moral principles; 
and those from the more moderate branch of particularism at least do not recognize the 
relevance of principled ethics (Alberzart, 2013, p. 339). Partisans of the opposing party 
– the generalists – retain the presumption to search and express moral principles 
(Leibowitz, 2013, p. 125). To illustrate the matter, a typical example for a moral 
principle would be the imperative “You shall not lie”. Equally, the Kantian categorical 
imperative constitutes a moral principle. But also utilitarianism can be seen as a 
generalist – hence principled – approach to ethics. The rule of maximizing utility for 
example displays an attempt to formulate a moral principle that identifies the rightness 
of an act (Leibowitz, 2013, p. 122). Apparently, the enlightenment ethics are generalist 
accounts. By contrast, Aristotle’s account on ethics – also virtue ethics in total – is often 
seen as being particularist. I am inclined to disagree with this view and will in the 
following try to develop the argument that phronetic judgement in fact is a sort of 
principled ethics.
To prepare the argument, let us here introduce the terms of the universal and of 
the particular. Note that all principles are universals; but not all universals are 
principles.50 Blaug (2000) rephrases the issue of moral principles and draws a distinction 
between the Kantian universal approach to moral judgement and an Aristotelian view as 
we encourage it (p. 188). The idea is that for Kantians, “the act of judgement […] 
entailed a subsumption of the particular under the universal” (Blaug, 2000, p. 180). This 
universal can be in the Kantian tradition the categorical imperative or the duty “You 
shall not lie”. In any particular situation of moral judgement, the agent then – according 
Blaug’s view of the generalist account – subsumes the particular circumstances under 
                                               
50 For example “You shall not lie” is a principle that is qua principle formulated unconditionally and valid 
everywhere at all time. Therefore, it is a universal. By contrast, we have already introduced Aristotle’s 
example for a universal, namely that “Light meat is easily digestible”. This universal, however, is clearly 
not a moral principle.
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universal, he seeks for guidance in the imperative or other Kantian duties. In fact, such 
an approach would be based on moral principles and therefore generalist. Now let us 
turn to our Aristotelian account. True, there is no apparent “subsumption of the 
particular under the universal” in phronetic judgement as we have characterized it; we 
have even praised these account for having an eye for the particular, the situational. So 
can we conclude that encouraging phronetic judgement would mean to subscribe to 
particularism and reject a principled account on ethics? What is illuminating about 
Blaug’s project is that it enables us to elude the latter conclusions. It uncovers that 
phronetic judgement can be seen as principled and therefore as not particularist. The 
idea is that phronēsis does not – in an alleged opposition to generalism – reject the 
existence of universals. Rather, exercising phronēsis means “to discern the universal in 
the particular” (Blaug, 2000, p. 188).51 So we must explain how this discerning of the 
universal in the particular works, and then show that at least some of these universals 
can be de facto moral principles.
That we do in fact discern the universal in the particular becomes more obvious 
when we recall the action-syllogism we have established for phronetic judgement. The 
role of the universal and the particular in the syllogism is evident: what we have called 
the major premiss reflects the universal, whereas the particular is present in the minor 
premiss (cf. Gottlieb, 2009, p. 165). Consider the scheme of the action-syllogism:
Major Premiss: To judge with regard to some good.
Minor Premiss: To judge with regard to the possible given the situation. 
Conclusion: To take an action and judge.
What else does “to judge with regard to some good” express but a universal? And what 
is “possible” in the concrete circumstances is certainly referring to the particular. So to 
“discern the universal in the particular” equals in the case of phronetic judgement what 
we have introduced as deliberative specification, more precisely the process of 
specifying the universal of the major premiss based on the particular situation stated in 
                                               
51 This idea to “discern the universal in the particular” is apparently also implicit in the concept of the 
“exemplary validity” of a judgement. Here, Blaug refers to an idea by H. Arendt and further provides an 
Aristotelian case to illustrate the point: “Achilles […] could be described as brave, and reasons could be 
given for the validity of this description, because his actions were examples of the universal, ‘bravery’” 
(Blaug, 2000, p. 188).
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the minor premiss. In the process of specification, the major premiss will be adjusted to 
what is required in the situation. Thus, the universal is not static, but to be specified. It 
is now necessary to demonstrate that the universal stated in the major premiss can be a 
principle.
At this stage of the argument, critics might still hold that the sort of universal we 
formulated is never a principle but only a moral commonplace, like all “exceptionless 
generalizations we can discover [in Aristotle’s ethics] are trivial truisms” (Leibowitz, 
2013, p. 146). I wish to place two replies here. Indeed, postulating a universal like “to 
judge with regard to some good” seems to be a commonplace – but it is not. If it were a 
trivial postulate, it would be commonly agreeable. But as we have discussed, there are 
ethical approaches to judgement that do not apply such forms of universals. Consider 
for example a Kantian syllogism on political judgement. Its major premiss would rather 
represent some duty or imperative than the end of judging with regards to the good.
Consequently, on the basis that other ethical theories do not subscribe to our sort of 
universals, it seems to be not a commonplace in terms of ethical practice.
Secondly, I believe the perception of our universal as a truism is based on a 
misunderstanding, namely that “to judge with regards to some good” would be an 
empty proposition; instead, our universal stated in the major premiss is not only ethical 
in its form, but also in its content. What then is its content? Correctly understood, the 
content of our universal “to judge with regard to some good” consists of all virtuous 
acts that the agent has experienced and we have already highlighted the importance of 
experience for acquiring practical wisdom. We must understand the universal as 
containing “descriptive summaries of good judgements” (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 299). In 
the process of deliberative specification, the agent – starting from the vague notion of 
judging “with regard to some good” – considers these “descriptive summaries of good 
judgements” with an eye for the concrete situation in order to be eventually able to 
specify the major premiss in the form of an end; the latter must be sufficiently concrete 
to start deliberating on the appropriate means, in other words, on the correct political 
judgement. To round off our argument for a non-particularist view of phronetic 
judgement, let us look at the good past judgement that come to play when we the agent 
specifies the major premiss. There is no reason to assume that these past judgements 
would merely consist of non-principled acts. For the only condition is that these past 
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judgements must be good judgements, they can consist of judgements based on 
intuition, judgements based on rules or laws, and also of judgments based on moral 
principles. Therefore, in phronetic judgement – more precisely when one considers 
good past judgements in the deliberative specification – it is plausible that one might 
also consider moral principles. Thus, as opposed to the common view that Aristotelian 
views on ethics and more precisely on judgement would ignore principles or at least 
their relevance, I hope to have shown that it can be reasonably argued that our proposal 
on phronetic judgement is an account that – also – considers moral principles.52
With this finding I conclude the examination of the peculiar characteristics of 
phronetic judgement in comparison to rival ethical theories. It was my aim to establish 
phronetic judgement as a mode of deliberation that is distinct from other ethical 
account. With regard to Kantian and utilitarian ethics, phronetic judgement offers an 
account that is less rule-bound, more agent-centred and rather balanced in terms of the 
roles of intuition and reason; to assume that it is a sort of arbitrary ethics, however, 
seems fallacious. The phronimos might also consider the value of moral principles in 
the particular situation of political judgement.
                                               
52 One qualification is necessary. In the mode of deliberation that we called phronetic judgement, we 
never deliberate on a specific sort of principles, namely on principles as “ultimate authorities” against 
which the truth of a particular judgement is to be assessed (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 299). First, we never 
assess the truth of a particular judgement using a principle, as this would be precisely the “subsumption of 
the particular under the universal”. Second, this sort of principle does not represent the sort of universal 
we recognize and discern in the particular act of phronetic judgement. The point is that accepting such 
principles – appearing as “ultimate authorities” – would contradict the project of phronetic judgement 
itself, because, as Nussbaum (1986) shows, judgement would be exercised like a science and therefore 
become a matter technē or epistēmē, but never of phronēsis (p. 300).
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V. Phronetic Judgement and Politics
Recall that we have argued for encouraging phronetic judgement in matters that address 
the “security and justice of a real community”. These are matters that are political,
which is why we have used the term political judgement.  Therefore our proposed mode 
of ethical deliberation also brings out ramifications in the sphere of politics. It is the 
task of this chapter to discuss such political ramifications of our proposal, namely the 
concerns about the compatibility of phronetic judgement with pluralism and with the 
rule of law. Let us first illustrate the relevance of both concerns and consider again the 
real-life case of Stanislav Petrov.
Petrov has received awards and been honoured as the Man who saved the World; 
but it is also part of the truth that the popular appraisal only appeared decades after the 
actual incident. The political and military authorities’ ironic response right after the 
event was quite different. As some sort of quasi-punishment for not following the 
convention – which defined his duty to immediately report the supposed alarm to the 
respective authorities – Petrov was “reprimanded for not filling out the logbook that 
day” (The Guardian, 2008). And true, the case of Stanislav Petrov is just one example in 
which the exercise of phronēsis might have culminated in a judgement that urged the 
moral agent to breach a convention, be it an institutional rule or even a law and 
therefore raises the question whether we – in encouraging phronetic judgement –
motivate notorious violation of laws.53
Concerning the issue of pluralism, we might recall that Stanislav Petrov – if we 
are right in supposing that he exercised practical wisdom – must have considered what 
is good in the particular situation. Presupposing that in political judgement others are 
concerned, the puzzling point is how can we reconcile the idea that the phronimos acts 
on behalf of others’ good – or better on behalf on what he beliefs to be the others’ good
                                               
53 Here, an analogy to the case of Petrov is the case of Wolfgang Daschner. In 2002 in Frankfurt, police 
vice-president Daschner gave the order to express a threat to torture in interrogations with a kidnapper
who had hidden an 11-year-old boy.  According to reports, Daschner, after careful consideration, gave 
this order fully aware of the implicit breach of law and for the sake of the child’s survival. Daschner’s 
choice was clearly a political judgement and it can be assumed that we could also detect the 
characteristics of exercising phronēsis; and most importantly at this point of the discussion, Daschner’s 
judgement implied the breach of a law and was prosecuted later one  (cf. Jessberger, 2005).
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– with the idea of pluralism. I will start with the latter issue and then proceed with the 
problem related to the rule of law.
Phronetic Judgement and Pluralism
In Chapter II we have argued that one of the appealing characteristics of phronēsis is 
that it enables us to form a view of the good in light of political judgement. What we 
have so far not discussed is what this good precisely is. Two aspects should be clarified, 
namely the different sorts of the good and the different levels of the good. The concern 
for pluralism derives mainly from the latter aspect, as I believe. When one talks about 
the good one might talk on the level of one’s own good, of others’ goods, or of the good 
of the whole community. The supposed problem with pluralism derives from the claim 
that the phronimos is not only capable of discovering what is good for one, but also 
“what is good for human beings in general” (NE VI. 5, 1140b9), including what is good 
for the political community (Pol. III. 4, 1277a14-15).54 So we must reconcile the idea of 
one person being able to form a view on the good for all with the pluralist’s claim that 
people have different conceptions of the good life. Before, it is important to address the 
first aspect mentioned above and to find out about the different sorts of the good.
I adhere to the common interpretation that there are three sorts of the good in 
Aristotle (cf. Kraut, 2002; Gottlieb, 2009). There is the chief human good at the top of 
the hierarchy. Further there is some good that is both, intrinsically valuable and for the 
sake of the chief human good. Lastly, there are good things that have only an 
instrumental value. Examples for the latter sort are tools, whereas virtues are among the 
higher goods (Gottlieb, 2009, p. 135). What then is the chief human good? The chief 
human good in Aristotle’s ethics is happiness [eudaimonia]55; it can be more narrowly 
defined as “the activity of soul in accordance with excellence” (NE I. 7, 1098a16-17). 
Aristotle’s chief human good is one that has intrinsic value, can never be a means to 
achieve any other good and is not conditioned on some identifiable property that all 
good things have in common. Authors describe this notion of the good as one that 
                                               
54 A similar thought on supposedly identical nature of excellence and political expertise can be found in 
the Politics, for example: “So the education and habits that make a man excellent are essentially the same 
as those that make him a political or kingly [ruler]” (Pol. III. 18, 1288al41-bl2).
55 Here, Broadie adopts Rowe’s translation, but not without qualifying it: apparently, eudaimonia does not 
mean happiness in a sense of feeling good, because “being eudaimōn is not about something” but rather 
expresses that others are considering the person as admirable (Broadie, 2002, p. 12).
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breaks with the Platonic tradition (cf. Gadamer 1986; Broadie, 2002). Aristotle’s 
approach to the good “puts the Platonic heritage […] on the grounds of physics” 
(Gadamer, 1968, p. 158), because it dismisses the idea to develop a science of the good 
that aims to design a formula similar to mathematics. By contrast, Aristotle purports the 
good must be formulated to be applicable in human practice and perceived as “the 
fulfilment of what being means” (Gadamer, 1986, p. 158).56 Hence, what might appear 
first as an imprecise sort of definition for the human good, seems to be the result of a 
conscious and more general consideration by Aristotle. Exactly due to this Aristotelian 
approach, we have a proper starting point for our attempt to reconcile our thesis on 
phronetic judgement and the concerns about pluralism.
That the phronimos is capable of forming a view on the good is compatible with 
pluralism because the notion of the good is formulated in a way that it displays a 
second-order value.57 Second-order values are distinct from first-order values in terms of 
their constituents. Content-specific values – these are first-order values – contain one or 
more constituents; content-neutral values – hence second-order values – do not; 
meaning they do not “fully specify any particular states of affairs” (Colburn 2010, p. 
250). To illustrate the matter: if our chief human good was wealth, for example, it 
would be incompatible with pluralism. Why? As the notion of wealth contains variables 
– the amount of cash and the value of freehold property, and so on – it would be a first-
order value. Not all humans in pluralistic society would accept the relevance of the 
variables like money, property, and so on. For example, one person could hold that 
health is the chief human good and be seriously at odds with the view that wealth is the 
highest of all goods. By contrast, happiness is not content-specific and therefore a 
secondary-order value. These values are compatible with pluralism, as I believe, 
because they allow for plural approaches on how to specify their content; the one who 
believes in the primacy of wealth and the one who believes in primacy of health can 
nonetheless agree on happiness as a chief human good. Thus, my argument is that the 
good as formulated in Aristotle’s ethical treatise is compatible with pluralism because it 
                                               
56 Gadamer even seems to suggest we consider two distinct sorts of the good. Firstly, what we might 
define as the good in theory, and secondly the notion of the good we can employ in the realm of human 
conduct. Apparently, Aristotle’s discourses are about the latter (cf. Gadamer, 1986, p. 160).   
57 I borrow the idea of second-order values from Colburn who used it in defence of Raz’s concept of 
autonomy (cf. Colburn, 2010)
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is formulated in a way that allows for individual’s distinct constituents of a choice-
worthy life in practice.58
To find out that the problem of pluralism is not yet fully resolved, consider again
the scheme of our action-syllogism:
Major Premiss: To judge with regard to some good.
Minor Premiss: To judge with regard to the possible given the situation. 
Conclusion: To take an action and judge.
At this stage of the argument, we only discussed the chief human good; so this is what 
“some good” as stated in the major premiss means here. It is a not clearly defined end 
that lacks constituents. But in the process of phronetic judgement, the phronimos will 
specify the major premiss with regard to what is stated in the minor premiss. And in the 
process of specifying the major premiss, the meaning of “some good” changes, from the 
chief human good to one of the remaining two sorts of the good, possibly to a virtue or 
to a tool. This is when the phronimos adds constituents to the notion of “some good”. 
Consequently, we cannot speak of a second-order value anymore and the previous 
argument must be supplemented. What the phronimos specified as the concrete 
constituent of the major premiss, for example health, might in fact be at odds with 
other’s preferred constituents, for example wealth.  
Nonetheless, I maintain that phronetic judgement does not necessarily contradict 
pluralism. To address the problem let us consider Nussbaum’s view (1986), as she 
perceives Aristotle as one “who defends a conception of a city as a ‘plurality’ […]” (p. 
352). This position is only comprehensible after introducing the notion of justice. I shall 
begin my argument with the claim that phronetic judgement can be reconciled with 
pluralism also after the major premiss has been specified; because the agent who 
exercises phronēsis is not only aware of what is good for the others, but always has an 
eye for their good and thus considers it in the deliberative specification. Nussbaum 
(1986) calls this the “relational nature” of excellences (p. 352). But, where would this 
capacity derive from? It is justice that is necessary to make the otherwise self-referred 
                                               
58 Some hints that might explicitly indicate Aristotle’s recognition of pluralism can be retrieved from the 
Politics; for example the statement that the “city is a partnership of free persons” (Pol. III. 6, 1279a21).
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excellences other-related. Justice is the same disposition as the excellences of character, 
but distinct as it applies in cases when “the state relates to another person” (NE V. 2, 
1130a13). Hence, justice adds precisely what was required to accomplish the argument. 
It can be understood as the virtue that enables us to exercise the excellences in situations 
that involve others. The moral agent in phronetic judgement will therefore always 
deliberate and specify the constituents of the major premiss with an eye for justice, that 
is, with an eye for the good of the others. Therefore it can be confirmed that phronetic
judgement does not necessarily contradict pluralism; certainly not on the universal level 
of the chief human good, and only to the degree to which such conflict over competing 
claims is inevitable when one has to make judgements that concern others on the 
concrete particular level .
Phronetic Judgement and Laws
It has been discussed that phronetic judgement may lead to conflict with conventions. 
The case of Stanislav Petrov, who violated for the sake of phronetic judgement the 
internal rules of the Soviet army, is one example. It is unfortunate if the agent who 
exercises phronēsis must face severe consequences at work; it is of greater political 
significance if one’s phronetic judgement results in a conflict with the law.59 And to 
reasonably uphold the thesis on phronetic judgement, we must show that such a conflict 
with laws is not implicit. For, it would be irrational to encourage phronetic judgement 
knowing that it disturbs the rule of law and endangers political stability. Let us begin to 
discuss the matter exploring Aristotle’s view on law.
The starting point of the argument must be a crucial distinction in Aristotle’s 
theory; most of the elements necessary to grasp this distinction have already been 
discussed. The point is, that law and phronetic judgement are not about the same thing. 
On the one hand, phronetic judgement – as we have seen – is always about concrete 
situations of political judgement and therefore about the particular; law, on the other 
hand, is about universal pronouncements (NE V. 10, 1137b14-15). Laws are, therefore, 
good to shape matters that concern the universal and in that respect their validity and 
value is – needless to say – undoubted. What then are these matters that concern the 
universal? To guarantee stability and to ensure proportionality in terms of distribution 
                                               
59 For an example, see the case of W. Daschner, outlined at the beginning of this chapter.
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of power, for example, Aristotle considers the law as a useful means (Pol. VI. 5, 
1319b37-40; Pol. V. 8, 1308b17-19). Hence, we must understand that the distinction 
between the law and phronetic judgement is defined according to the difference between 
universals and particulars. Consequently, there is no inherent conflict as both concepts 
are related to difference spheres. Yet, one might object that the laws or conventions do 
and must also apply in the concrete particular situation and I wish to place two 
statements.
First, I wish to qualify the objection. We must recall the nature of phronēsis, in 
particular in how far it is different from technical expertise (cf. Gadamer, 1998, p. 3). 
By definition, phronēsis is not concerned with the implementation of pre-defined rules 
or laws. It always involves the agent’s deliberation and can never entail the blind 
execution of something external. For that reason it would be contradictory to ask the 
agent in political judgement to – under all circumstances – obey the law; it would also 
be inconsistent with the larger project of this investigation, because we have actually 
praised Stanislav Petrov for a – supposedly phronetic – judgement that implied the 
breach a rule.
Further, my reply to the objection is that encouraging phronetic judgement does 
not imply to fully ignore laws in particular situations. This concern is wrong and must 
be qualified. We do not deny the general capacity of the law to deal with particulars; for 
what would be the purpose of laws that are not applicable in the concrete case? The 
claim is more modest than that, since what we deny is merely the law’s capacity to 
properly deal with all particulars. And the problem consists of the fact that in those 
exceptional particular situations in which the law – as it is originally related to 
universals – fails to guide and judge properly, it nonetheless does. In those exceptional 
situations the law, as Aristotle put it, “chooses what holds for the most part, in full 
knowledge of the error it is making” (NE V. 10, 1137b17-18). This is precisely the 
reason why Petrov had to breach the rule to make the good judgement. It is evident that
such a course of action is only legitimate in exceptional situations.
The latter view is also in line with the rationale of the discussion in the previous 
chapter on phronetic judgement and universals and with the action-syllogism:
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Major Premiss: To judge with regard to some good.
Minor Premiss: To judge with regard to the possible given the situation. 
Conclusion: To take an action and judge.
By encouraging the exercise of phronēsis in political judgement, the role and 
importance of the universal and of the laws related to the universal is not contested. The 
law is part of the agent’s experience and considered in the specification of the major 
premiss. What is meant is that the agent will “seek to bring the new case under a rule” 
(Nussbaum, 1986, pp. 299), but simultaneously also be capable to reason on whether 
any such universal rule or law is applicable with regard to what is possible in the
concrete, particular situation as stated in the minor premiss. The agent’s deliberation in 
that sense oscillates between the major premiss stating the end to be specified –
including notions of the law – and the minor premiss that accounts for the possible. 
Only if the possibility-condition in the minor premiss forbids to specifying the major 
premiss in line with the laws, the phronimos will judge in a way that breaches the rule. 
And only in such very exceptional cases does encouraging phronetic judgement imply a 
breach of the law.
Further, one might wonder who determines whether the case is exceptional and 
allows for a breach of the law or not. In other words, we must examine whether a 
phronetic approach to political judgement leaves too much room for the agent to 
determine if he should follow the predefined law or rule, or instead choose a course of 
action that is oppose to what would be conventional. In fact, as I admit, this problem of 
discretionary power is a serious one in this respect. I wish to make two points that 
address this issue.
Let us first approach the issue asking what might lead the respective agent to 
misuse the discretionary power when confronted with political judgement. True, there is 
a constant temptation for humans to avoid the good, driven by all sorts of motives; thus, 
we can speak of a notorious risk that we choose for the bad. Yet, we must recall that 
exercising phronēsis enables us to choose for the good, so the one who possesses 
excellence in that respect is less likely to misuse the power he is given. So, we may 
adjust the focus of the question and ask instead: what would make the agent not misuse 
the discretionary power? It appears that it is reasonableness that encourages the agent to 
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deal properly with the powers we assign him. Being reasonable is related to being just 
(NE V. 10, 1138a3-5). And – as we have seen – the person who possesses practical 
wisdom is also excellence in terms of justice. Consequently, it can be concluded that the 
one who possesses phronēsis is also reasonable. Reasonableness contributes to the issue 
at hand, as it displays a sort of being just, but “not the just according to law, but rather a 
rectification of the legally just” (NE V. 10, 1137b12-13). Thus, reasonableness refers
precisely to the exceptional cases in which the legally just – in other words, what the 
law stipulates – is not truly good. In such cases then, it is better to be reasonable than to 
be just, and the reasonable will act in accordance with the good in such cases, but in 
others will not misuse the discretionary power.
Let us move on with the second point then. I believe it to be implausible to have 
an agent that misuses the discretionary power that we assign in encouraging phronetic
judgement because of the following argument: Possessing phronēsis implies to be able 
to form a view about the good; we have discussed this aspect in detail. More precisely, 
it implies to have the capacity to form a view about what is good for oneself, what is 
good for others, and about what is good for the political community. Let us focus on the 
latter aspect and assume that someone misuses his discretionary power, meaning he –
confronted with political judgement – breaches the law without necessity, meaning in a 
particular case that was covered by the universal law. Surely, this agent could justify his 
conduct – or better misconduct – stating that in the particular case reasoning has led him
to believe that the universal character of the law or rule does not account for the 
concrete, particular situation. And the concern is that the agent might repeat this form 
of misconduct constantly taking advantage of his discretionary power. But such a 
concern is misplaced, as I think, because a person who possesses practical wisdom 
would not do this by definition. Instead, the phronimos must seriously consider that 
every breach of the law endangers the stability – and therefore the good – of the 
community. And – as we have emphasized – the agent who exercises practical wisdom 
always has an eye for the good of the political community (Pol. IV. 1, 1289a11-3). It 
would be, therefore, not reasonable to illegitimately breech the law and constantly put 
the good of the political community at risk. In other words, only the unreasonable
would misuses his discretionary power because it is bad for the stability of the political 
community. But – as has just been examined – the phronetic agent is reasonable.
49
Because I consider them fundamental, I hope to have treated the two main 
concerns about our proposal’s implications on politics seriously without suggesting a 
final resolution. Yet, we have seen that there is reason to believe that the idea of 
phronetic judgement can be compatible with pluralism and with the notion of the law. It 
is first and foremost the task of the phronimos to have an eye for the good of others and 
to deal properly with his discretionary power. Regardless of the human factor that 
always implies the risk of being corrupted, we have demonstrated that the phronimos 
possesses the excellences needed to be responsible with regard to these issues.
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VI. Conclusion
In the recent revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics, phronēsis has been widely discussed. 
It is possibly a sort of backlash with regard to those who see in practical wisdom the 
solution to all sorts of real or supposed problems60 that explains best the equally general 
comments that reject the applicability of Aristotle’s discourse to the circumstances of 
modern society. That phronēsis as a concept is elitist or undemocratic (Nussbaum in 
Ruderman, 1997, p. 409; Ruderman in Tabachnick, 2004, p. 998) cannot be confirmed 
on the basis of this study’s insights. Having considered the political implications, also 
the general claims on the inapplicability of Aristotle’s ideas to our world appear 
erroneous. Rather, as I propose, Aristotle’s phronēsis works best if we concurrently 
approve the broader Aristotelian framework. Therefore, one should be cautious with 
major revisions of the latter in order to retain its consistency. By all means, for 
phronetic judgement we have examined that the virtue phronēsis can – together with 
related concepts such as the excellences of character, justice and so on – constitute a 
distinct and plausible mode of deliberation.
Whereas I perceive it as valuable for the construction of phronetic judgement to 
consider also related Aristotelian notions and therefore his wider theory, we might want 
to choose a rather narrow scope for our proposal’s application. It must therefore be 
emphasized that phronetic judgement must be seen as an exceptional mode of 
deliberation for exceptional circumstances; at least it has only been designed and tested 
as such in this study. My scepticism about a wider application is not so much about 
man’s capacity to make phronetic judgement; in fact, I tend to think practical wisdom is 
not per se an elitist virtue. The challenge might rather derive that phronetic judgement is 
regardless of its validity not always popular or opportunistic. It is therefore questionable 
whether the public would maintain moral support for the respective moral agents when 
phronetic judgement – including its possible tension with the rule of law – becomes 
daily business. And a loss of public moral support could be harmful, as I believe; 
because the community’s excellence in terms of trusting, encouraging and rewarding the 
                                               
60 See for example the discussions on the value of phronēsis in the context of ethical practice in distinct 
domains such as international relations theory (Brown, 2012) and commerce (Nyberg, 2007, p. 578) or as 
a possible response to over-rationalization and technology and democratic participation (Tabachnik, 
2004; Blaug, 2000).
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phronimos’ capacity to correctly detect the exceptional instances for phronetic 
judgement is as important as the phronimos’ own excellences.
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